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The general objective of this paper is to identify the link between collective 
bargaining and labour conflict resolution in Nigeria’s public sector. Other 
objectives are to examine the nature of collective bargaining and conflict 
resolution mechanisms; and to ascertain the effectiveness of collective 
bargaining in solving the problems arising from labour conflicts in the public 
sector. It should be noted that industrial peace and working harmony are 
essential to the realisation of the goals and objectives of public sector 
organisations in Nigeria. The paper comprises: abstract; introduction; 
conceptual framework/literature review; discussion of findings; conclusion and 
recommendations. The paper observed that even though the history of collective 
bargaining in Nigeria is traceable to the public sector, the machinery has 
performed relatively poorly due to the uniqueness and employment practices of 
government as an employer of labour and its regulatory role. Predicated on the 
Dunlop/Flanders’ industrial relations model and the survey research method as 
utilised in this study, it was also found that there is limited appreciation of the 
role of collective bargaining, and this hampers its efficacy in labour conflict 
resolution in Nigeria’s public sector. This results from the narrow view of 
collective bargaining in approach and practice by managers of industrial 
relations in the public sector. The recommendations suggested can adequately 
invigorate the use of collective bargaining in labour conflict resolution in the 
public sector. 




The extent to which public sector 
organisations characterised by rigid 
bureaucratic structure and mechanistic 
management philosophies of the classical 
theorists could promote workers 
participation in management; particularly 
in consultation with the unions is subject 
to serious investigation. Attitudinal 
tendencies like this circumscribe the 
potency of collective bargaining as a 
platform for labour conflict resolution. 
 There are those who believe that poor 
workers’ welfare and insensitivity on the 
part of employers or their management 
representatives offer some explanations for 
causes of conflicts in organisations.  In this 
respect, it is posited that the wage 
structure in the Nigerian Public Sector and 
by extension the living conditions are low.  
Salaries/emoluments are not only poor, but 
payment can be quite irregular. When this 
is viewed against the backdrop of 
ostentatious living among political 
leaders/elites and managers of the Public 
Sector, conflict becomes inevitable 
especially in situation where the machinery 
and process of collective bargaining is not 
given firm footing. 
 The widely held misconception that 
union-management interaction must be 
adversary and combative is anchored on 
the existence of dual interest groups (in 
organisations) with different goals and 
motivation.  One group is represented by 
employers of labour or the management 
whose primary concern is profit 
maximization or service delivery at any and 
all costs.  The second group is made up of 
workers-their goal is to achieve improved 
welfare and better working conditions.  The 
Ife PsychologIA, 21(2), September 2013 
- 221 - 
 
achievement of these seeming disparate 
goals dictates attitudes and strategies that 
bring the interest groups on collision path 
and ultimately conflict.  Collective 
bargaining then rises to this challenge. 
 Perfidy or deliberate refusal to honour 
collective agreements arrived at through the 
consensual process of collective bargaining 
are rife among employers/management 
representatives of some public sector 
organisations.  When processes like these 
are jettisoned, an atmosphere of conflict 
which collective bargaining ought to 
neutralize festers. 
 The thrust of Dunlop/Flanders’ model of 
industrial relations are: that industrial 
relations is an area of relations between 
workers’ union; managers of organisations 
and government as regulator; these three 
actors develop a web of rules governing 
their relations in the workplace; the web of 
rules consists of procedural and 
substantive rules of relations; industrial 
relations is viewed as a subsystem within 
the larger system/society and it is the 
larger society that provides the external 
environment which influences industrial 
relations actors and institutions. An 
industrial relations system comprises 
certain contexts, an ideology which binds 
the system together and a body of rules 
created to govern the three actors. 
 
Method 
The study adopted survey research which 
elicited data from sampled population 
through questionnaires and interviews. The 
population of the study is 7766 staff made 
up of Management and NULGE members in 
12 (4 LGAs in each of the 3 senatorial 
zones) out of the 23 local government 
Councils in Rivers State. The research 
made use of 10% sample size amounting to 
780 staff selected through stratified 
sampling. Questionnaires were 
administered on 740 out of 780 staff, while 
the remaining 40 staff were interviewed 
using purposive sampling. The 
administration of research instruments 
took cognizance of the Strata namely: 
Management, Senior and Junior which 
spread across the following departments: 
Administration/Personnel; Finance and 
Audit; Planning Research and Statistics in 
PortHarcourt; Obi/Akpor; Emohua; 
Ikwerre; Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni; Obua-Odual; 
Alwada-East; Ahoada-West; Tai; Eleme; 
Khana and Gokana local government areas. 
The secondary sources of data comprise 
books, journals, seminar papers and 
newspapers which have relevant 
contributions to the study. 
 
Conceptual Framework / Literature Review 
Collective bargaining which is mostly 
concerned with the work relationship 
between unions representing employees 
and employers (or their management 
representatives) is an indispensable 
ingredient or part of an effective industrial 
relations system.  It involves the process of 
union organization of employees, 
negotiation, administration and 
interpretation of collective agreements 
covering issues such as wages, hours of 
works, separation, work and its allocation 
between workers or group of workers (Ngu, 
1994:123). It also includes procedural 
agreement and other conditions of 
employment, engaging in concerted 
economic action and dispute settlement 
procedures/conflict management and 
resolution. 
     The origin of collective bargaining in 
Nigeria is traceable to the public sector, and 
as Fashoyin (1999:104) recorded, “…this 
was as a result of the near absence of a 
private sector at the turn of the (19th) 
century”. He corroborated that British Bank 
of West Africa (now known as First Bank of 
Nigeria) founded in 1894 was not unionized 
until 1942.  Even the Royal Niger Company 
(now UAC of Nigeria) with vast political and 
commercial interests in Nigeria was not 
organized until 1946.  Fashoyin noted 
“…ironically, the machinery has performed 
relatively poorly…” The emphasis here is 
that the history of collective bargaining is 
traceable to the public sector, but the 
machinery of collective bargaining has 
performed rather poorly in the sector.  
Elsewhere, he attributed this relative poor 
performance of the machinery and practice 
of collective bargaining to “…the 
uniqueness of the employer” (Fashoyin, 
1999:154). 
 Generally, collective bargaining can be 
seen as a process and as a method.  As a 
process, it is dynamic (moving in ideas) and 
can be employed as a conflict resolution 
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technique.  As a method, it can be viewed 
as a technique used by trade union 
(leaders) and managers of organisations to 
establish and maintain cordial work 
relations (Ngu, 1994:124).  Uvieghara 
(2001:388) opined that “the term ‘collective 
bargaining’ is applied to those 
arrangements under which wages and 
conditions of employment are settled by a 
bargain, in the form of an agreement made 
between employers or associations of 
employers and workers’ organizations”.   He 
expatiated that “the long term interest of 
government, employers and trade unions 
alike would seem to rest on the process of 
consultation and discussion which is the 
foundation of democracy in industry”.  If 
the objective of Collective bargaining is to 
“reach agreement by bargain”, why does 
conflict arise in work relations? Elele (2008) 
attempted an explanation by alluding to the 
differences in interest and goals of the 
union and employers.  The puzzle that 
must be addressed in Uvieghara’s 
submission is the reference to collective 
bargaining as the foundation of industrial 
democracy. 
 Expatiating on the understanding of 
Beatrice and Sidney Webb on collective 
bargaining, Flanders (1968) in Ojo 
(1998:137) emphasized the “rule making 
process” of collective bargaining which 
according to the author transcends 
negotiation of economic terms of a contract 
and defines the rights and relationship 
among workers, union officials and 
employers.  This rule making process of 
collective bargaining confers the 
jurisprudence status on it in labour 
relations.  Cole (2005:415) progressed by 
typologising agreement into procedural and 
substantive.  Procedural agreements “are 
formal, written procedures that act as a 
voluntary code of conduct for the parties 
concerned…”  The parties concerned are 
managers and employees together with 
their union representatives.  Substantive 
agreements “are formal, written agreements 
containing the terms under which, for the 
time being, employees are to be employed”.  
Such agreements run for limited or 
specified period of time.  Fashoyin 
(1999:126 -127) building on Flanders 
referred to substantive agreements as 
collective agreements which deals with 
“wage and working hours or to other job 
terms and conditions in the segment of 
employment covered by agreement”.  
Procedural agreement “…deals with such 
matters as the method to be used and the 
stages to be followed in the settlement of 
disputes, or perhaps the facilities and 
standing to be accorded to representatives 
of parties to the agreement”.  Procedural 
agreements can be timeless (not time 
bound) and could function as the operative 
and recital clause to most industrial 
relations policies of organisations. 
 Onah (2008) joined other scholars in 
stating the ideal that “collective bargaining 
process is the foundation of industrial 
democracy”, but it is relieving that he 
added that unilateral regulation or primacy 
of wage commissions which has become a 
norm in the Nigerian Public Sector vitiates 
the ideal. Indeed, that industrial democracy 
cannot take firm footing in the Nigerian 
work/labour relations is systemic, this is 
reinforced by the fact that the democratic 
experience is wobbling despite the “rule of 
law” mantra.   The author stated conditions 
for collective bargaining and gave 
types/strategies for collective bargaining as: 
centralised or regulated and decentralized 
or deregulated.  In centralized or regulated 
collective bargaining, the umbrella 
employers association negotiates 
collectively with unions as representatives 
of workers.  This has the advantage of 
setting the baseline or minimum upon 
which individual employer can negotiate 
with house or enterprise unions.  
Deregulated bargaining is a process 
whereby an employer of labour negotiates 
wages and other conditions of service 
directly with representatives of workers 
(house unions) within the overall economic 
condition prevailing in the country.  The 
rationale and driving force for deregulated 
bargaining is the ability to pay principle 
(Onah, 2008:385-387). 
 
Collective Bargaining in the Nigerian Public 
Sector 
 There is agreement among scholars and 
writers in this area not only in the fact that 
collective bargaining started in the Public 
sector, but also in the explanation for same 
(Otite, 1994; Ojo, 1998; Fashoyin, 1999; 
Uvieghara, 2001 and Onah, 2008).  
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Fashoyin (1999:154) and Uvieghara 
(2001:389) succinctly put it that even 
though, collective bargaining started in the 
public sector, it was not meant for it.  The 
nature and reasons for this will be 
unraveled in this section.  The agrarian 
nature of the Nigerian economy at the wake 
of the 20th century, the near absence of a 
private sector and the dominance of 
government as employer of labour were 
some of the reasons adduced in favour of 
the early inception of collective bargaining 
in the public sector. 
 Ojo (1998:141) has been quite vociferous 
in his assertion that “in practice, collective 
bargaining has never played significant role 
in labour relations in the public sector in 
Nigeria”.  He emphasized that “infact, 
government being the major employer of 
organized labour has impacted negatively 
on the practice of collective bargaining in 
the private sector through its employment 
practices and actions.”  Ojo (1998) 
highlights the limitations and restrictions of 
the Whitley councils and the succeeding 
National Public Negotiating Councils.  This 
point was reinforced by Uvieghara 
(2001:389) that inspite of these councils “in 
the public sector, there has not always been 
meaningful bargaining…” He corroborates 
that “the phenomenon of the appointment, 
on almost a regular basis, of commissions 
to review and recommend wages and other 
conditions of employment of public servants 
is a clear manifestation of the absence of 
collective bargaining in the public sector”. 
 It is pertinent to note that the 
phenomenon and primacy of wage 
commissions that comprised mainly of top 
government officials reviewing and 
recommending wages, salaries, allowances 
and other fringe benefits unilaterally 
continued until 1942 when workers 
protested the practice (Fashoyin,1999:105). 
Although, the dominance of wage 
commissions had waned in recent times.  
Ojo (1998:141) reported that government 
“has not ceased to determine wages 
unilaterally”.  Babangida’s unilateral 45 
percent wage increase/approval was cited 
as a case in point.  Unilateral actions of this 
type amount to excessive paternalism and 
unnecessary autocracy.  It is devoid of joint 
consultation and collective decision making 
which collective bargaining emphasizes.  In 
circumstances like this, communication is 
one way, closed and devoid of feedback.  
Workers are left with no other means than 
to generate feedback through their unions 
by finding a “release valve” in form of 
industrial actions for pent up anger. 
 Fashoyin (1999:156-157) expatiated that 
wage commissions derived their legitimacy 
from “three contending perspectives” 
namely: the doctrine of sovereignty which 
implies that government represents 
sovereign power and as such, only it could 
determine employment conditions. The 
second is the often-stated policy 
(amounting to canticles) which emphasizes 
“government’s commitment to a fair wage 
and equity in employment situation”.  The 
third perspective is that the determination 
of wages and other conditions of 
employment in the public sector is a 
political matter. The tendency is for 
government in a politically volatile and 
developing economy like Nigeria to banalise 
issues like this to the realms of patronage 
as a means of currying workers/unions 
support. 
 It is also important to highlight the role 
of the Civil Service Rules in management 
labour relations policies in the public 
sector.  The Civil service rule is the 
equivalent of the Human Resources policies 
in the private sector.  However, in the 
public sector, the Establishment 
Departments of government which 
administers the rules frequently prescribe 
employment conditions unilaterally.  
Perhaps, it is necessary to draw a 
correlation between unilateral actions and 
“culture of impunity” which is a carryover 
from military incursion into governance and 
the Nigerian public administration system. 
 Worthy of mention is the issue of 
salaries and allowances in the Nigerian 
public sector labour relations.  Not only are 
salaries poor for certain category of 
workers, the frequency is very low, and 
quite demotivating. Onah (2008:389) 
buttressed thus “…because government has 
been largely unable to pay salaries 
regularly.  The group that has suffered 
most is the local government staff; hence it 
is more common for them to be on strike 
than being on duty”. He submitted 
conclusively that “all sectors including the 
police, have embarked on strikes of 
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different colours.”   What role does 
collective bargaining play in these 
situations? 
 Collective bargaining in the public sector 
is effected through the National Public 
Service Negotiating Councils (NPSNC), and 
it is done as laid down in the constitution of 
NPSNC.  This constitution is similar to the 
procedural agreement in the private sector 
and it permeates the public sector.  The 
Collective bargaining functions of the 
NPSNC according to Fashoyin (1999:165-
166) are as follows: 
- General responsibility for negotiating all 
matters affecting the conditions of 
Service of Civil servants. 
- Advising the government, where 
necessary, on the best means of 
utilizing the ideas and experience, of 
civil servants, with a view to improving 
productivity. 
- Reviewing the general conditions of civil 
servants e.g. recruitment, hours of 
work, promotion, disciplines, salary, 
fringe benefits and superannuation, 
provided that in matters relating to 
recruitment, discipline and promotion, 
the council shall restrict itself to general 
principles. 
The NPSNC carries out collective bargaining 
in the public sector at three levels thus: 
 The centralized federal bargaining 
through the NPSNC 1 as represented by 
the Establishment Department of the 
Federal and State governments and union 
representing staff from Grade levels 07-14 
at the federal and state civil services.  
 NPSNC 2 as represented by 
Establishment Department (as described 
above) and unions representing typists, 
stenographic/allied staff, executive and 
non-industrial cadres from Grade levels 
01-06 at federal and state civil services.  
 NPSNC 3 –Management represented (as 
described above) and representatives of 
five unions namely: The Civil Service 
Technical Workers Union of Nigeria; 
Printing and Publishing Workers Union; 
Medical and Health Workers Union; 
National Association of Nigerian Nurses 
and Midwives; Customs, Excise and 
Immigration staff union. 
-  The State Negotiating Council comprising 
councils 1, 2, 3 but confirming their 
activities to terms of employment at the 
state level. 
-  Departmental (Ministerial) Negotiating 
Committee comprising any of the civil 
service  unions on the one hand, and the 
Management of a particular ministry or 
department on the other.  Issues of local 
interest are negotiated or discussed at this 
level (Fashoyin, 1999:163). 
 It is instructive to note that there are 
forty-four negotiators each in NPSNC 1, 2 
and 3.  The wieldy membership nature 
makes negotiations look like carnival or 
jamboree that cannot be taken serious.  
States’ representatives of the NPSNC hardly 
all attend and when they do, attention is 
not total; these explain the dominance of 
the federal government in the determination 
of employment conditions in the public 
sector. 
 
Conflict Resolution in the Nigerian Public 
Sector 
 Ojo (1998:126-133) identifies the 
internal (voluntary) and external (Statutory) 
machineries of conflict resolution in the 
Nigerian public sector.  He articulated the 
discourse in three distinct periodic phases: 
1941-1967; 1968-1975; 1976 and beyond.  
The 1941-1967 period saw the colonial 
principle of voluntarism underscoring 
public labour policy.  The principle 
emphasised the freedom of the employer 
and unions to choose the means they prefer 
to settle disputes and grievances.  The 1941 
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) 
Ordinance allowed not only the use of 
internal machinery, but was rather too 
permissive in the use of the statutory 
machinery, which accorded parties to a 
dispute the freedom to choose from 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration as a 
means of settling conflicts.  
  Under this law, it was not compulsory 
for parties at conflict to appear before the 
statutory panels and when government 
intervened in disputes, it could not enforce 
solutions on the parties at the dispute.  In 
addition to the foregoing, arbitration panels 
were raised on an ad-hoc basis to deal with 
disputes as they arose, in other words, 
there were no permanent statutory 
institutions to deal with conflicts. The 
consent of parties to a dispute had to be 
sought by government before cases were 
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referred to arbitration.  This laissez-faire 
approach to conflict resolution offered less 
relevance in collective bargaining in this 
phase. 
 The 1968-1975 periods coincided with 
the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war, and 
it dawned on government that the 
permissiveness of the principle of 
voluntarism inherited from colonial rule 
combined with the uncertainties of war 
situation could be hijacked by workers and 
the union in particular to exact concessions 
from management and government.  Ojo 
(1998:126) buttressed “…that neither 
government nor management would want a 
strike at that time”.  In order to avoid 
granting concessions to workers/union, 
government opted for a policy of 
intervention in labour relations. 
 The above scenario led to the 
promulgation of the Trade Disputes 
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1968 which 
was amended by the Trade Disputes 
(Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act of 
1969.  These laws imposed a total ban on 
strikes and lockouts.  It also directed that 
wage increases by employers must be 
subject to government approval.  Fashoyin 
(1999:199) commented that the prohibition 
of strike on issues requiring “compulsory 
arbitration, particularly in the public sector 
has proved ineffective” even in more 
democratic societies of Western Europe and 
North America. 
 The laws (1968 and 1969 Act) also 
established the Industrial Arbitration 
Tribunal whose decisions as approved by 
commissioner (now Minister) of Labour 
were final and binding.  This era signalled 
compulsory arbitration procedure for 
conflict resolution.  Thus, voluntarism 
caved in for the principle of intervention to 
emerge supposedly as a temporary measure 
– one year at first instance but “it was 
maintained until 1975” (Ojo, 1998:127). 
The author in reinforcing Fashoyin (1980) 
observed that the impact of these laws were 
felt for a brief period following their 
promulgation as it led to some degree of 
restraint, but failed almost completely to 
stop the occurrence of disputes and work 
stoppages. 
 The 1976 period and beyond witnessed 
government’s desire to monitor the role of 
workers and employers in order to step up 
and sustain economic activities after the 
civil war.  The Trade Disputes Act of 1976 
was promulgated to modify the 1968 and 
1969 Act.  Conflict resolution in the public 
sector (in this period) derived from the 
Trade Disputes Act of 1976 and Trade 
Disputes (Essential Services) Act of 1976.  
The internal machinery popularly referred 
to as the grievance procedure provides for 
several stages of resolving conflicts between 
union members and management, starting 
from the shop steward level with the 
supervisor through the departmental level 
to middle management and to the top 
management level (in case conflicts could 
not be resolved at the lower levels with the 
union). 
 Ebiloma (2001:82-83) in contributing to 
this discourse affirmed that “…conflict 
resolutions are guided by the provisions of 
the Trade Disputes Act of 1976, as 
amended in 1977” and corroborated that “it 
is possible to identify sixteen (16) important 
features of the Act…”as outlined below: 
- Copies of Agreement: Three copies of the 
negotiated agreement must be deposited 
with the Minister of Labour and 
Productivity. 
- If the agreement provides for a particular 
mode of settlement other than the one 
provided for in the Act, the Minister 
must insist that the parties comply with 
that mode. 
- If not, the two must subject themselves 
to a mediator to seek amicable 
settlement. 
- In the event of failure of the mediator to 
resolve the problem, the minister shall 
appoint a conciliator if he is satisfied 
that the provisions of the Act have been 
substantially complied with, otherwise 
he shall insist in writing, that the 
prescribed procedure be followed. 
- If the solution is still not found to the 
problem, the Minister shall refer the 
matter to the Industrial Arbitration 
Panel (I.A.P) which is expected to 
discuss the issue within 42 days.  If this 
fails, the minister shall grant extension 
as he deems fit. 
- If the Industrial Arbitration Panel makes 
award to any party, this is not 
immediately communicated to the party 
concerned until the Minister has gone 
through the award to decide whether or 
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not to remit the case to the Industrial 
Arbitration Panel for a reconsideration 
before communicating it to the party 
concerned. 
- If the Minister is satisfied with the award 
by Industrial Arbitration Panel, he shall 
communicate it to the parties who have 
21 days to accept or reject it. 
- If the Minister does not receive any 
objection from the parties within 21 
days, he will confirm the award. 
- However, if either or both parties object 
to or reject (the award), the case will be 
referred to the National Industrial Court 
(NIC). 
- At any time a dispute is in the N.I.C or 
the I.A.P. has made an award in respect 
of a dispute, the Act bans strikes or 
lockouts. 
- According to the Act, the decision of the 
court in this matter is final and binding 
on the parties thereof.  There shall be 
no appeal to any other body or person 
except when constitutional issues are 
involved. 
- The Act, as amended by the Trade 
Unions Disputes (Amendment) Decree 
No 54 of 1977, provides that the 
Minister or any party to the award may 
make an application to the court for a 
decision on the interpretation of the 
award by I.A.P which has become 
binding on the parties. 
- In the same way, the Minister or any 
party to the agreement may make on 
application to the court for the 
interpretation of collective agreement. 
- Upon receipt of such application, the 
court shall then decide the matter after 
hearing the Minister’s brief or, as the 
case may be the parties to the 
agreement or with their prior consent, 
without hearing from them. Such 
decision by the court shall be final and 
conducive with respect to the 
interpretation of the terms or provisions 
of the agreement. 
- The Act makes it clear that the parties to 
a dispute before the court are: 
 (a) Organisation of workers (Unions) 
and  
 (b) Employer or an Organisation of 
Employers such as the Nigeria  
  Employers Consultative Association 
(NECA). 
- The Act further provides that an 
individual has no locus standi before 
the court, even though the dispute may 
arise out of the treatment meted out to 
an individual worker, such as wrongful 
dismissal of a worker. 
Ebiloma (2001:84) added that despite the 
laudable features of these legislations, the 
federal government did not put appropriate 
institutions and structures capable of 
negotiating directly with workers’ unions. 
Besides, the procedural implications of the 
laws portend danger for the practice of 
collective bargaining in the public sector.  
The duration of forty-two days within which 
the IAP has to dispose of cases is rather too 
long, the cumbersome nature of the 
processes does not help in the conduct of 
effective industrial relations system.  
Fashoyin (1999:197) reinforced that in the 
public sector, cases referred to arbitration 
could span longer than forty-two days as “a 
large number of cases…had no known 
duration.  In most of such cases, political 
settlements were reached, or the cases 
fizzled away!” 
 In view of the above and perceived 
partiality in the arbitral process, the unions 
in the public sector tend to be sceptical 
about the efficacy of arbitration in conflict 
resolution in the public sector.  The 
Industrial Arbitration Panel which still 
operates within the civil service structure 
and the National Industrial Court with 
original jurisdiction on disputes emanating 
from the “essential service” section and 
those directly referred to it by the Minister 
of Employment, Labour and Productivity 
(MELP), need to overcome their 
shortcomings in order to play their expected 
roles in the conflict resolution process with 
a view to strengthening collective 
bargaining in the public sector. 
 The above averment is underscored by 
the relative weakness resulting in limited 
use of mediation in the conflict resolution 
process due in the main to the failure of the 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity 
to enforce the provisions requiring its use 
and to have a list of mediators who could be 
used (Ojo, 1998:130).  It is also pertinent to 
note that the services of a mediator are to 
be paid for by parties at dispute.  This is 
also in addition to the difficulty “in certain 
cases, for the parties (in dispute) to agree 
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on a mediator as required by law”.  Thus, 
the required report to the Minister of 
Labour stating that mediation has failed is 
written by the mediator.  The Minister then 
initiates conciliation which is at no cost to 
the parties in dispute.  “Conciliation 
therefore almost replaces mediation 
practically as the first statutory method of 
resolving conflicts; it is seen as 
supplementary to collective bargaining.  It 
is more successful in resolving disputes 
involving procedural issues, 
implementation of agreements and other 
rights issues…” (Fashoyin, 1999:195). 
 Girigiri (2002:16) reinforcing Akpala 
(1982) contended that these legislations on 
conflict resolution in the public sector 
“amount to the curtailment of the processes 
of collective bargaining because of the 
elements of compulsion in them”.  
Nonetheless, they signalled movement from 
principle of voluntarism to that of 
interventionism which projected 
government not only as being responsible, 
but responsive and alive to its regulatory 
role in collective bargaining and industrial 
relations in general.  The loophole however, 
remains the ineffectiveness of the 
legislations in stemming incidences of 
strike and other forms of industrial action 
arising from a culture of impunity by the 
unions and the employer – A point 
underscored by late Justice Aguda as 
contained in Fashoyin (1999:198). 
 
Findings of the Study 
In a sense, the avowed commitment to joint 
consultation (with the union) is 
perfunctory, plastic and rudimentary. It 
amounts to giving a right with one hand 
and taking it with the other. The efficacy of 
collective bargaining as machinery for 
conflict resolution in circumscribed by 
unjust and inequitable practices like these.  
The semblance of collective bargaining 
practice in Rivers State local government is 
explicable in the light of Management 
consultation with the union on quarterly 
basis to appraise vital work related issues. 
However, the timelag between one meeting 
and the other is considered too long in view 
of the bureaucratic nature of public sector 
organisations.  
 The narrow content of collective 
bargaining (in the perception of 
Management) impinges on its use as 
conflict resolution machinery, thus its 
application hardly attenuates conflict, 
except for the “fire brigade” techniques like 
persuasion and other manipulative 
techniques, which was highlighted during 
the interview session.  One other important 
finding of the study is the identification of a 
semblance of collective bargaining practice 
without a supplemental approach that can 
create the necessary buffer for its 
weaknesses. The use of collective 
bargaining strategies and tactics 
(underscored above) by the Managers 
amounts to gimmicks and a mockery of 
collective bargaining process in an 
organized setting. It does not guarantee the 
efficacy of collective bargaining as a 
solution to labour conflicts.  The above 
implies that Management pays lip service to 
collective bargaining and clearly manifests 
paternalism (reinforced by Freud in 
Fashoyin 1999:6) as a style adopted in 
collective bargaining and this is amply 
reflected in the practices in Rivers State 
local government system. 
 A final finding of this study is that 
collective bargaining operates in theory in 
Rivers State local government system in 
view of the limited access to and knowledge 
of the Public Service Rules as a working 
manual in the local government system. 
This vitiates the substantive rules and 
issues in the collective bargaining process. 
In this information and communication 
driven age, it is curious and unacceptable 
for a public servant to sigh the Public 
Service Rules (for the first time) as the 
instruction guide for employment contract 
only at the point of default. This does not 
augur well for the collective bargaining 
process and conflict resolution mechanism. 
 The methods and stages in conflict 
resolution in Rivers State local government 
system are not sufficiently adhered to. The 
factor impinges on the workings of 
procedural rules as a major ingredient in 
the collective bargaining process, and this 
accounts or the palpable state of collective 
bargaining process in the system. As a 
corollary, the rights to be accorded union 
representatives as a party in the collective 
bargaining process are breached. This is an 
affront on the effective application of 
substantive rules as a major plank upon 
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which the collective bargaining the unions 
and the employer – A point underscored by 
Late Justice Aguda as contained in 
Fashoyin (1999:198). 
 
Discussion of Findings 
In this study conducted using the 
Dunlop/Flanders’ Industrial Relations 
model with twelve local government areas 
spread across the three Senatorial zones in 
Rivers State as focus, it was observed that 
collective bargaining operates on minimum 
benchmarks. This is explicable in the light 
of inadequate appreciation for the human 
element in the workplace as manifested in 
payment of salaries/allowances and 
Christmas bonus only as incentives to 
workers. The use of promotion, merit award 
and additional incentives for hard work and 
display of initiative is less prominent. These 
explain the dissatisfaction of workers and 
the combative posture of staff in pressing 
for better conditions of service. It must be 
stated that result-oriented managers of the 
local government system in the 21st century 
must be prepared to think “out of the box” 
and fashion out extra-statutory methods 
and incentives as practiced in the private 
sector (to motivate workers).  This is the 
new thinking and approach to the New 
Public Management (NPM), and in tackling 
the contemporary challenges and changes 
in the collective bargaining process and 
conflict resolution. The link between good 
motivation strategies and effective collective 
bargaining practice cannot be 
overemphasized. 
 Another finding of the study is that there 
is a narrow view of Collective bargaining (in 
consent and practice), especially on the 
part of Managers of the local government 
system and this limits the effective use of 
Collective bargaining especially in conflict 
resolution .In discussing this finding, 
collective bargaining is construed mainly in 
terms of remuneration, instead of seeing it 
in a holistic sense.  This factor aggravated 
discontent in work relations between 
NULGE and Managers of the local 
government system, as evidenced by spate 
of violent demonstrations.  To be sure, 
managerial philosophy and practices 
anchored on narrow beliefs like these 
hamper the effective use of collective 
bargaining in resolving labour conflicts. The 
contributions of the Industrial Relations 
System theorists like J. T. Dunlop, Flanders 
and later refinements by Fashoyin (1999) 
and Otobo (2000) on the dynamic and 
comprehensive nature of collective 
bargaining is instructive. Further support 
for this finding was expresses by the 
reluctance and tardiness on the part of 
management in honouring and 
implementing valid agreements which 
infuriates the union a great deal. With this 
state of affairs, collective bargaining 
suffered  a major setback in this connection 
as a potent tool of achieving harmonious 
work relations. The procedural and 
substantive rules of work relations as 
canvassed by Allan Flanders in Otobo 
(2000: 28-29) is jettisoned in the process. 
 One other finding of this study is the 
asymmetry of the conflict resolution 
mechanism in favour of the management, 
thus hindering the maximum utilization of 
the collective bargaining machinery. One 
factor explaining the above finding is the 
non-representation of the union on the 
disciplinary committee of Rivers State local 
government system.  The fairness and 
equity of collective bargaining as a 
machinery for redress and conflict 
resolution is suspect and questionable. This 
is at variance with the procedural rules of 
relations as highlighted by Dunlop and 
Flanders, and as a cardinal plank upon 
which the collective bargaining process 
rests in line with the industrial relations 
system model as utilised in this study. 
 In a sense, the avowed commitment to 
joint consultation (with the union) is 
perfunctory, plastic and rudimentary.  It 
amounts to giving a right with one hand 
and taking it with the other.  The efficacy of 
collective bargaining as a machinery for 
conflict resolution is circumscribed by 
unjust and inequitable practices like these.  
The semblance of collective bargaining 
practice in Rivers State local government is 
explicable in the light of Management 
consultation with the union on quarterly 
basis to appraise vital work related issues.  
However, the time lag between one meeting 
and the other is considered too long in view 
of the bureaucratic nature of public sector 
organisations. The narrow content of 
collective bargaining (in the perception of 
Management) impinges on its use as 
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conflict resolution machinery, thus its 
application hardly attenuates conflict, 
except for the “fire brigade” techniques like 
persuasion and other manipulative 
techniques, which was highlighted during 
the interview session. 
 One other important finding of this 
study is the identification of a semblance of 
collective bargaining practice without a 
supplemental approach that can create the 
necessary buffer for its weaknesses. The 
use of collective bargaining strategies and 
tactics (underscored above) by the 
Managers amounts to gimmicks and a 
mockery of collective bargaining process in 
an organized setting.  It does not guarantee 
the efficacy of collective bargaining as a 
solution to labour conflicts. The above 
implies that Management pays lip service to 
collective bargaining and clearly manifests 
paternalism (reinforced by Freund in 
Fashoyin, 1999:6) as a style adopted in 
collective bargaining and this is amply 
reflected in the practices in Rivers State 
local government system 
 A final finding of this study is that 
collective bargaining operates in theory in 
Rivers State local government system in 
view of the limited access to and knowledge 
of the Public Service Rules as a working 
manual in the local government system. 
This vitiates the substantive rules and 
issues in the collective bargaining process. 
In this information and communication 
driven age, it is curious and unacceptable 
for a public servant to sight the Public 
Service Rules (for the first time) as the 
instruction guide for employment contract 
only at the point of default.  This does not 
augur well for the collective bargaining 
process and conflict resolution mechanism. 
 The methods and stages to be followed in 
conflict resolution in Rivers State local 
government system are not sufficiently 
adhered to.  This factor impinges on the 
workings of procedural rules as a major 
ingredient in the collective bargaining 
process, and this accounts for the palpable 
state of collective bargaining process in the 
system. As a corollary, the rights to be 
accorded union representatives as a party 
in the collective bargaining process are 
breached.  This is an affront on the effective 
application of substantive rules as a major 
plank upon which the collective bargaining 
process rests.  In the face of these, 
collective bargaining is hamstrung as a 
process of resolving labour conflicts. 
 
Conclusion 
As observed in this paper in the synthesis 
of positions taken by some scholars, 
collective bargaining in Nigeria is traceable 
to the public sector, but the machinery has 
performed relatively poorly due to the 
nature of the employer (government) with 
its attribute of being omnipotent and 
ubiquitous.  The role of government as an 
employer of labour and as regulator was 
highlighted.  The paper noted the 
movement by government from the 
principle of voluntarism to interventionism 
with its attendant implication of attempting 
to stabilize the practice of collective 
bargaining in the public sector, and later in 
the private sector. 
 It was reiterated that the effective 
practice of collective bargaining processes 
and machinery holds the promise of 
achieving stability and regularity in the 
work place through procedural and 
substantive rules with the objective of 
ensuring credible mechanism for peaceful 
resolution of labour conflicts.   
 
Recommendations 
This study strongly recommends the 
introduction of extra-statutory methods 
and incentives comparable to those in the 
private sector to motivate workers in order 
to elicit hard work and maximum display of 
initiative.  These can be in form of merit 
awards, productivity bonuses, vacation 
travel/leisure incentives, children 
education subsidies and other desirable 
schemes.  In addition, periodic review in 
remuneration and other welfare packages 
should be initiated without the workers 
agitating for them.  Through these 
strategies, the local government system and 
the public sector in general will become a 
better place for the union and Management. 
 There should be a conscious and 
deliberate effort on the part of the unions 
and the Management to strengthen the 
machinery and process of collective 
bargaining in order to facilitate its use in 
conflict resolution.  This, the management 
can do by divesting itself of the paternalistic 
tendencies associated with the excessive 
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management style prescribed by classical 
administrative theorists.  On the part of 
unions, constant and constructive 
engagement/discourse with their 
Management on critical issues will be 
beneficial.  The adoption of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution mechanism which has 
the supplemental benefit of encouraging 
communication in conflict situations is 
highly recommended in preventing 
deadlock in the collective bargaining 
process. 
 Collective bargaining would further 
strengthen union-management relations in 
the Public Sector if “need based” worker 
education can be introduced.  The content 
of such worker education must include: 
general re-orientation; the organizational 
environment; management-union 
relationship (Management – Employee 
interactive forum); transparent and fair 
grievance procedure/conflict resolution 
mechanism; inter-personal relations and 
leadership development.  The application of 
human relations approach which goes 
beyond the physical and mechanical 
aspects of work relations to taking care of 
the psychological aspect / needs of the 
worker is strongly recommended in 
industrial relations practice in the Public 
Sector. This has the potency of reducing 
incidences of labour conflicts. 
 The paper recommends that there 
should be a deepening of democratic 
culture and practices as a plank upon 
which the processes and provisions of 
collective bargaining can be built and 
sustained. As a corollary, democratic 
institutions such as the judiciary and other 
watchdog organizations require further 
strengthening and their independence must 
be guaranteed to enable them play their 
roles as the “last hope of the oppressed” 
and bastion  of democracy.  The 
Management of the Local Government 
System and public sector in Nigeria should 
avoid unnecessary delays in the 
implementation of agreements reached with 
the union.  Such recalcitrant moves have 
the tendency of provoking fresh 
demonstrations or a trade dispute. 
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